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a b s t r a c t
In the stable marriage problem, a set of men and a set of women are given, each
of whom has a strictly ordered preference list over the acceptable agents in the
opposite class. A matching is called stable if it is not blocked by any pair of
agents, who mutually prefer each other to their respective partner. Ties in the
preferences allow for three different definitions for a stable matching: weak, strong
and super-stability. Besides this, acceptable pairs in the instance can be restricted
in their ability of blocking a matching or being part of it, which again generates
three categories of restrictions on acceptable pairs. Forced pairs must be in a stable
matching, forbidden pairs must not appear in it, and lastly, free pairs cannot block
any matching.
Our computational complexity study targets the existence of a stable solution
for each of the three stability definitions, in the presence of each of the three types
of restricted pairs. We solve all cases that were still open. As a byproduct, we also
derive that the maximum size weakly stable matching problem is hard even in
very dense graphs, which may be of independent interest.
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under
the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
In the classical stable marriage problem (sm) [1], a bipartite graph is given, where one side symbolizes
a set of men U , while the other side symbolizes a set of women W . Man u and woman w are connected
by the edge uw if they find one another mutually acceptable. In the most basic setting, each participant
provides a strictly ordered preference list of the acceptable agents of the opposite gender. An edge uw blocks
matching M if it is not in M , but each of u and w is either unmatched or prefers the other to their respective
partner in M . A stable matching is a matching not blocked by any edge. From the seminal paper of Gale
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Table 1
The three types of restricted edges are marked with bold letters. The columns tell edge uw’s role regarding
being in a matching, while the rows split cases based on uw’s ability to block a matching.
uw must be in M uw can be in M uw must not be in M
uw can block M Forced Unrestricted Forbidden
uw cannot block M Forced Free Irrelevant
and Shapley [1], we know that the existence of such a stable solution is guaranteed and a stable matching
can be found in linear time.
Several real-world applications [2] require a relaxation of the strict order to weak order, or, in other words,
preference lists with ties, leading to the stable marriage problem with ties (smt) [3–5]. When ties occur, the
definition of a blocking edge needs to be revisited. In the literature, three intuitive definitions are used,
namely weakly, strongly and super-stable matchings [3]. According to weak stability, a matching is weakly
blocked by an edge uw if agents u and w both strictly prefer one another to their partners in the matching.
A strongly blocking edge is preferred strictly by one end vertex, whereas it is not strictly worse than the
matching edge at the other end vertex. A super-blocking edge is at least as good as the matching edge for
both end vertices in the super-stable case. Super-stable matchings are strongly stable and strongly stable
matchings are weakly stable by definition, because weakly blocking edges are strongly blocking, and strongly
blocking edges are super-blocking at the same time.
Weak and strong stability serve as the goal to achieve in most applications, such as college admission
programs. In most countries, colleges are not required to rank all applicants in a strict order of preference,
hence large ties occur in their lists. According to the equal treatment policy used in Chile and Hungary
for example, it may not occur that a student is rejected from a college preferred by her, even though other
students with the same score are admitted [6,7]. Other countries, such as Ireland [8], break ties with lottery,
which gives way to a weakly stable solution according to the original, weak order. Super-stable matchings can
represent safe solutions if agents provide uncertain preferences that mask an underlying strict order [9–11].
If two edges are in the same tie because of incomplete information derived from the agent, then super-stable
matchings form the set of matchings that guarantee stability for all possible true preferences.
Another classical direction of research is to distinguish some of the edges based on their ability to be
part of or to block a matching. Table 1 provides a structured overview of the three sorts of restricted edges
that have been defined in earlier papers [12–17]. The mechanism designer can specify three sets of restricted
edges: forced edges must be in the output matching, forbidden edges must not appear in it, and finally, free
edges cannot block the matching, regardless of the preference ordering.
The market designer’s motivation behind forced and forbidden edges is clear. By adding these restricted
edges to the instance, one can shrink the set of stable solutions to the matchings that contain a particularly
important or avoid an unwelcome partnership between agents. Free edges model a less intuitive, yet
ubiquitous scenario in applications [15]. Agents are often not aware of the preferences of others, not even
once the matching has been specified. This typically occurs in very large markets, such as job markets [18],
or if the preferences are calculated rather than just provided by the agents, such as in medical [19] and social
markets [20]. Agents who cannot exchange their preferences are connected via a free edge. If a matching is
only blocked by free edges, then no pair of agents can undermine the stability of it.
In this paper, we combine weakly ordered lists and restricted edges, and determine the computational
complexity of finding a stable matching in all cases not solved yet.
1.1. Literature review
We first focus on the known results for the smt problem without restricted edges, and then switch to the
sm problem with edge restrictions. Finally, we list all progress up to our paper in smt with restricted edges.
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Ties. If all edges are unrestricted, a weakly stable matching always exists, because generating any linear
extension to each preference list results in a classical sm instance, which admits a solution [1]. This solution
remains stable in the original instance as well. On the other hand, strong and super-stable matchings are
not guaranteed to exist. However, there are polynomial-time algorithms to output a strongly/super-stable
matching or a proof for its nonexistence [3,21]. Very recently, new integer linear programming models have
been presented for various hard problems in smt with weak stability and incomplete lists [22].
Restricted edges. Dias et al. [13] showed that the problem of finding a stable matching in a sm instance with
forced and forbidden edges or reporting that none exists is solvable in O(m) time, where m is the number of
edges in the instance. Approximation algorithms for instances not admitting any stable matching including
all forced and avoiding all forbidden edges were studied in [17]. The existence of free edges can only enlarge
the set of stable solutions, thus a stable matching with free edges always exists. However, in the presence of
free edges, a maximum-cardinality stable matching is NP-hard to find [15]. Kwanashie [16, Sections 4 and 5]
performed an exhaustive study on various stable matching problems with free edges. The term “stable with
free edges” [19,23] is equivalent to the adjective “socially stable” [15,16] for a matching.
Ties and restricted edges. Table 2 illustrates the known and our new results on problems that arise when
ties and restricted edges are combined in an instance. Weakly stable matchings in the presence of forbidden
edges were studied by Scott [24], where the author shows that deciding whether a matching exists avoiding
the set of forbidden edges is NP-complete. A similar hardness result was derived by Manlove et al. [25]
for the case of forced edges, even if the instance has a single forced edge. Forced and forbidden edges in
super-stable matchings were studied by Fleiner et al. [14], who gave a polynomial-time algorithm to decide
whether a stable solution exists. Strong stability in the presence of forced and forbidden edges is covered
by Kunysz [26], who gave a polynomial-time algorithm for the weighted strongly stable matching problem
with non-negative edge weights. Since strongly stable matchings are always of the same cardinality [4,27], a
stable solution or a proof for its nonexistence can be found via setting the edge weights to 0 for forbidden
edges, 2 for forced edges, and 1 for unrestricted edges.
1.2. Our contributions
In Section 3 we prove a stronger result than the hardness proof in [24] delivers: we show that finding a
weakly stable matching in the presence of forbidden edges is NP-complete even if the instance has a single
forbidden edge.
As a byproduct, we gain insight into the well-known maximum size weakly stable matching problem
(without any edge restriction). This problem is known to be NP-complete [25,28], even if preference lists
are of length at most three [29,30]. On the other hand, if the graph is complete, a complete weakly stable
matching is guaranteed to exist. It turns out that this completeness is absolutely crucial to keep the problem
tractable: as we show here, if the graph is a complete bipartite graph missing exactly one edge, then deciding
whether a perfect weakly stable matching exists is NP-complete.
We turn to the problem of free edges under strong and super-stability in Section 4. We show that deciding
whether a strongly/super-stable matching exists when free edges occur in the instance is NP-complete.
This hardness is in sharp contrast to the polynomial-time algorithms for the weighted strongly/super-stable
matching problems. Afterwards, we show that deciding the existence of a strongly or super-stable matching
in an instance with free edges is fixed-parameter tractable parameterized by the number of free edges.
2. Preliminaries
The input of the stable marriage problem with ties consists of a bipartite graph G = (U ∪ W, E) and for
each v ∈ U ∪ W , a weakly ordered preference list Ov of the edges incident to v. We denote the number of
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Table 2
Previous and our results summarized in a table. The contribution of this paper is marked by bold violet
font. The instance has n vertices, m edges, |P | forbidden edges, and |Q| forced edges.
Existence Weak Strong Super
Forbidden NP-complete [24] even if |P | = 1 O(nm) [26] O(m) [14]
Forced NP-complete even if |Q| = 1 [25] O(nm) [26] O(m) [14]
Free Always exists NP-complete NP-complete
vertices in G by n, while m stands for the number of edges. An edge connecting vertices u and w is denoted
by uw. We say that the preference lists in an instance are derived from a master list if there is a weak order
O of U ∪ W so that each Ov where v ∈ U ∪ W can be obtained by deleting entries from O.
The set of restricted edges consists of the set of forbidden edges P , the set of forced edges Q, and the set
of free edges F . These three sets are disjoint.
Definition 1. A matching M is weakly/strongly/super-stable with restricted edge sets P, Q, and F , if
M ∩ P = ∅, Q ⊆ M , and the set of edges blocking M in a weakly/strongly/super sense is a subset of F .
3. Weak stability
In Theorem 1 we present a hardness proof for the weakly stable matching problem with a single forbidden
edge, even if this edge is ranked last by both end vertices. The hardness of the maximum-cardinality weakly
stable matching problem in dense graphs (Theorem 2) follows easily from this result.
Problem 1. smt-forbidden-1
Input: A complete bipartite graph G = (U ∪ W, E), a forbidden edge P = {uw} and preference lists with
ties.
Question: Does there exist a weakly stable matching M so that uw /∈ M?
Theorem 1. smt-forbidden-1 is NP-complete, even if all ties are of length two, they appear only on one
side of the bipartition and at the beginning of the complete preference lists, and the forbidden edge is ranked
last by both its end vertices.
Proof. smt-forbidden-1 is clearly in NP, as any matching can be checked for weak stability in linear
time.
We reduce from the perfect-smti problem defined below, which is known to be NP-complete even if all
ties are of length two, and appear on one side of the bipartition and at the beginning of the preference lists,
as shown by Manlove et al. [25].
Problem 2. perfect-smti
Input: An incomplete bipartite graph G = (U ∪ W, E), and preference lists with ties.
Question: Does there exist a perfect weakly stable matching M?
Construction. To each instance I of perfect-smti, we construct an instance I ′ of smt-forbidden-1.
Let G = (U ∪W, E) be the underlying graph in instance I. When constructing G′ for I ′, we add two men
u1 and u2 to U , and two women w1 and w2 to W . On vertex classes U ′ = U∪{u1, u2} and W ′ = W ∪{w1, w2},
G′ will be a complete bipartite graph. As the list below shows, we start with the original edge set E(G) in
stage 0, and then add the remaining edges in four further stages. An example for the built graph is shown
in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. An example for the reduction. The legend below the graph lists the six groups of edges in the preference order at all vertices.
The edges from the perfect-smti instance (drawn in solid black) keep their ranks. Every vertex ranks solid black edges best, then
loosely dashed green edges, then densely dashed blue edges, then dotted red edges, then the wavy gray edge u1w1 and the forbidden
violet zigzag edge u2w2. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version
of this article.)
0. E(G)
We keep the edges in E(G) and also preserve the vertices’ rankings on them. These edges are solid
black in Fig. 1.
1. (U × {w1}) ∪ ({u1} × W )
We first connect u1 to all women in W , and w1 to all men in U . Man u1 (woman w1) ranks the women
from W (men from U) in an arbitrary order. Each u ∈ U (w ∈ W ) ranks w1 (u1) after all their edges
in E(G). These edges are loosely dashed green in Fig. 1.
2. (U × W ) \ E(G)
Now we add for each pair (u, w) ∈ U × W with uw /∈ E(G) the edge uw, where u (w) ranks w (u) even
after w1 (u1). These edges are densely dashed blue in Fig. 1.
3.
[
(U ∪ {u1}) × {w2}
]
∪
[
{u2} × (W ∪ {w1})
]
Man u2 is connected to all women from W ∪ {w1}, and ranks all these women in an arbitrary order.
The women from W ∪ {w1} rank u2 worse than any already added edge. Similarly, w2 is connected to
all men from M ∪ {u1}, and ranks all these men in an arbitrary order. The men from M ∪ {u1} rank
w2 worse than any already added edge. These edges are dotted red in Fig. 1.
4. u1w1 and u2w2
Finally, we add the edges u1w1 and u2w2, which are ranked last by both of their end vertices. Edge
u2w2 is the only forbidden edge and it is the violet zigzag edge in Fig. 1, while u1w1 is wavy gray.
Claim: I admits a perfect weakly stable matching if and only if I ′ admits a weakly stable matching not
containing u2w2.
(⇒) Let M be a perfect weakly stable matching in I. We construct M ′ as M ∪ {u1w2} ∪ {u2w1}. Clearly,
M ′ is a matching not containing the forbidden edge u2w2, so it only remains to show that M ′ is weakly
stable. We do this by case distinction on a possible weakly blocking edge.
0. E(G)
Since M does not admit a weakly blocking edge in I, no edge from the original E(G) can block M ′
weakly in I ′.
1. (U × {w1}) ∪ ({u1} × W )
All vertices in U ∪ W rank these edges lower than their edges in M ′.
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2. (U × W ) \ E(G)
Edges in this set cannot block M ′ weakly because they are ranked worse than edges in M ′ by both of
their end vertices.
3.
[
(U ∪ {u1}) × {w2}
]
∪
[
{u2} × (W ∪ {w1})
]
Vertices in U ∪ W prefer their edge in M ′ to all edges in this set. Since they are in M ′, u1w2 and u2w1
also cannot block M ′ weakly.
4. u1w1 and u2w2
These two edges are strictly worse than u1w2 ∈ M ′ and u2w1 ∈ M ′ at all four end vertices.
(⇐) Let M ′ be a weakly stable matching in I ′ and u2w2 /∈ M ′. Since G′ is a complete bipartite graph
with the same number of vertices on both sides, M ′ is a perfect matching. In particular, u2 and w2 are
matched by M ′, say to w and u, respectively. Since M ′ does not contain the forbidden edge u2w2, we have
that u ̸= u2 and w ̸= w2. Then we have w = w1 and u = u1, as uw blocks M ′ weakly otherwise.
If M ′ contains an edge uw /∈ E(G) with u ∈ U and w ∈ W , then this implies that uw1 is a weakly blocking
edge. Thus, M := M ′ \{u1w2, u2w1} ⊆ E(G), i.e. it is a perfect matching in G. This M is also weakly stable,
as any weakly blocking edge in G immediately implies a weakly blocking edge for M ′, a contradiction as M ′
is weakly stable. □
As a byproduct, we get that max-smti-dense, the problem of deciding whether an almost complete
bipartite graph admits a perfect weakly stable matching, is also NP-complete.
Problem 3. max-smti-dense
Input: A bipartite graph G = (U ∪ W, E), where E(G) = {uw : u ∈ U, w ∈ W} \ {u∗w∗} for some u∗ ∈ U
and w∗ ∈ W , and preference lists with ties.
Question: Does there exist a perfect weakly stable matching M?
Theorem 2. max-smti-dense is NP-complete, even if all ties are of length two, are on one side of the
bipartition, and appear at the beginning of the preference lists.
Proof. max-smti-dense is in NP, as a matching can be checked for stability in linear time.
We reduce from smt-forbidden-1. By Theorem 1, this problem is NP-complete even if the forbidden
edge uw is at the end of the preference lists of u and w. For each such instance I of smt-forbidden-1, we
construct an instance I ′ of max-smti-dense by deleting the forbidden edge uw.
Claim: The instance I admits a weakly stable matching if and only if I ′ admits a perfect weakly stable
matching.
(⇒) Let M be a weakly stable matching for I. As smt-forbidden-1 gets a complete bipartite graph
as an input, M is a perfect matching. Since M does not contain the edge uw, it is also a matching in I ′.
Moreover, M is weakly stable there, because the transformation only removed a possible blocking edge and
added none of these.
(⇐) Let M ′ be a perfect weakly stable matching in I ′. Since uw is at the end of the preference lists of u
and w, and M ′ is perfect, uw cannot block M ′. Thus, M ′ is weakly stable in I. □
Having shown a hardness result for the existence of a weakly stable matching even in very restricted
instances with a single forbidden edge in Theorem 1, we now turn our attention to strongly and super-stable
matchings.
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4. Strong and super-stability
As already mentioned in Section 1.1, strongly and super-stable matchings or a proof for their nonexistence
can be found in polynomial time even if both forced and forbidden edges occur in the instance [14,26]. Thus
we consider the case of free edges, and in Theorem 3 and Proposition 4 we show hardness for the strong and
super-stable matching problems in instances with free edges. The same construction suits both cases. Then,
in Proposition 5 we remark that both problems are fixed-parameter tractable with the number of free edges
|F | as the parameter.
Problem 4. ssmti-free
Input: A bipartite graph G = (U ∪ W, E), a set F ⊆ E of free edges, and preference lists with ties.
Question: Does there exist a matching M so that uw ∈ F for all uw ∈ E that block M in the
strongly/super-stable sense?
In ssmti-free, we define two problem variants simultaneously, because all our upcoming proofs are
identical for both of these problems. For the super-stable marriage problem with ties and free edges, all
super-blocking edges must be in F , while for the strongly stable marriage problem with ties and free edges,
it is sufficient if a subset of these, the strongly blocking edges, are in F .
Theorem 3. ssmti-free is NP-complete even in graphs with maximum degree four, and if preference lists
of women are derived from a master list.
Proof. ssmti-free is clearly in NP because the set of edges blocking a matching can be determined in
linear time.
We reduce from the 1-in-3 positive 3-sat problem, defined below, which is known to be NP-complete
[31–33].
Problem 5. 1-in-3 positive 3-sat
Input: A 3-SAT formula, in which no literal is negated and every variable occurs in exactly three clauses.
Question: Does there exist a satisfying truth assignment that sets exactly one literal in each clause to be
true?
Construction. To each instance I of 1-in-3 positive 3-sat, we construct an instance I ′ of ssmti-free.
Let x1, . . . , xn be the variables and C1, . . . , Cm be the clauses of the 1-in-3 positive 3-sat instance I. For
each clause Ci, we add a clause gadget consisting of three vertices ai, bi, and ci, where bi is connected to ai
and ci, as shown in Fig. 2. While vertices ai and bi do not have any further edges, ci will be incident to three
interconnecting edges leading to variable gadgets. These three edges are tied at the top of ci’s preference
list. Vertex bi is ranked first by ai and last by ci, and these two vertices are placed in a tie by bi.
For each variable xi, occurring in the three clauses Ci1 , Ci2 , and Ci3 , we add a variable gadget with nine
vertices yji , z
j
i , and w
j
i for j ∈ [3], as indicated in Fig. 3. Each vertex z
j
i is connected only to y
j
i by a free
edge, and these are the only free edges in our construction. For each (ℓ, j) ∈ [3]2, we add an edge wℓi y
j
i , which
is ranked second (after zji ) by y
j
i . The vertex wℓi ranks this edge at position one if ℓ = j and else at position
two. Finally, we connect the vertex wℓi to the vertex ciℓ by an interconnecting edge, ranked at position one
by ciℓ and position three by wℓi .
The resulting instance is bipartite: U = {zji , w
j
i , bi} is the set of men and W = {y
j
i , ci, ai} is the set of
women. These vertex sets are marked by white and black dots in Figs. 2 and 3. One easily sees that the
maximum degree in our reduction is four.
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Fig. 2. An example of a clause gadget for the clause Ci, containing the variables x1, x4, and x5. Clause Ci contains the second,
first, and first appearance of these three variables, respectively. The interconnecting edges are dashed and violet.
Fig. 3. An example of a variable gadget for the variable xi, where xi occurs exactly in the clauses C1, C3, and C5. Free edges are
marked by wavy lines, while interconnecting edges are dashed and violet.
Note that the preference lists of the women in the ssmti-free instance are derived from a master list.
The master list for the women W = {yji , ci, ai} is the following: At the top are all vertices of the form {z
j
i }
in a single tie, followed by all vertices of the form {wji } in a single tie, and finally, all other vertices {bi} at
the bottom of the preference list, in a single tie.
Claim: I has a staisfying truth assignment if and only if I ′ admits a strongly/super-stable matching.
(⇒) Let T be a satisfying truth assignment such that for each clause, exactly one literal is true. For each
true variable xi in this assignment, appearing in the clauses Ci1 , Ci2 , and Ci3 , let M contain the edges wℓi ciℓ
and yℓi zℓi for each ℓ ∈ [3]. For all other variables, let M contain wℓi yℓi for each ℓ ∈ [3]. For each clause Ci, add
the edge aibi to M .
Following these rules, we have constructed a matching. It remains to check that M is super-stable (and
thus also strongly stable). Since ai is matched to its only neighbor, it cannot be part of a super-blocking
edge. Since each ci is matched along an interconnecting edge, which is better than bi, no super-blocking edge
involves bi. A super-blocking interconnecting edge ciwℓj implies that wℓj is not matched to any yℓj , however
this is only true if ciwℓj ∈ M . A super-blocking edge wℓi y
j
i does not appear, as either wℓi is matched to its
unique first choice yℓi and therefore not part of a super-blocking edge, or y
j
i is matched to its unique first
choice zji , and thus, y
j
i is not part of a super-blocking edge.
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(⇐) Let M be a strongly stable matching (note that any super-stable matching is also strongly stable).
Then M contains the edge aibi, and ci is matched to a vertex wℓj for all i ∈ [m], as else cibi or aibi blocks M
strongly. If wℓjci ∈ M , then yaj zaj ∈ M for all a ∈ [3], as else wℓjyaj would be a strongly blocking edge. This,
however, implies that waj cja ∈ M for all a ∈ [3], as else waj cja would be a strongly blocking edge.
Thus, for each variable xi, the matching M contains either all edges wℓi ciℓ for ℓ ∈ [3] or none of these
edges. We set a variable to be true if and only if wℓi ciℓ ∈ M for ℓ ∈ [3]. For ci must be matched to a vertex
wℓj for all i ∈ [m], this induces a truth assignment such that for each clause, exactly one literal is set to be
true. □
The previous proof is aimed at the hardness of the restricted case, in which the underlying graph has a
low maximum degree. For the sake of completeness, we add another variant, which is defined in a complete
bipartite graph.
Proposition 4. ssmti-free is NP-complete, even in complete bipartite graphs, where each tie has length
at most three.
Proof. ssmti-free in the above described setting belongs to NP for the same reason as we used for the
general problem in Theorem 3: the set of edges blocking a matching can be determined in linear time. We
reduce from ssmti-free. Given an ssmti-free instance in graph G, we add all non-present edges between
men and women as free edges, ranked worse than any edge from E(G). We call the resulting graph H.
Clearly, a strongly/super-stable matching in G is also strongly/super-stable in H, as we only added free
edges.
Vice versa, let M be a strongly/super-stable matching in H. Let M ′ := M ∩ E(G) arise from M by
deleting all edges not in E(G). Then M ′ is clearly a matching in G, so it remains to show that M ′ is
strongly/super-stable.
Assume that there is a blocking edge uw in G, in the strongly/super-stable sense. Since uw is not blocking
in H, at least one of u and w has to be matched in H, but not in G. However, this vertex prefers uw also
to its partner in H, and thus, uw is also blocking in H, which is a contradiction. □
Note that ssmti-free becomes polynomial-time solvable if only a constant number of edges is free in the
same way as max-ssmi, the problem of finding a maximum-cardinality stable matching with strict lists and
free edges [15].
Proposition 5. ssmti-free can be solved in O(2knm) time in the strongly stable case, and in O(2km) time
in the super-stable case, where k := |F | is the number of free edges, n := |V (G)| is the number of vertices,
and m := |E(G)| is the number of edges.
Proof. For each subset Q ⊆ F of free edges, we construct an instance of ssmti-forced as follows. Mark
all edges in Q as forced, and delete all edges in F \ Q.
If any of the ssmti-forced instances admits a stable matching, then this is clearly a stable matching in
the ssmti-free instance, as only free edges were deleted. Vice versa, any solution M for the ssmti-free
instance containing exactly the set of forced edges Q (i.e. Q = M ∩ F ) immediately implies a solution for
the ssmti-forced instance with forced edges Q.
Clearly, there are 2k subsets of F . Since any instance of ssmti-forced can be solved in O(nm) time in
the strongly stable case [26] and in O(m) time in the super-stable case [14], the result follows. □
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5. Conclusion
Studying the stable marriage problem with ties combined with restricted edges, we have shown three NP-
completeness results. Our computational hardness results naturally lead to the question whether imposing
master lists on both sides makes the problems easier to solve. Moreover, it is open whether smt-forbidden-
1 remains hard in bounded-degree graphs. In addition, one may try to identify relevant parameters for our
problems and then decide whether they are fixed-parameter tractable or admit a polynomial-sized kernel
with respect to these parameters.
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[17] Á. Cseh, D.F. Manlove, Stable marriage and roommates problems with restricted edges: complexity and approximability,
Discrete Optim. 20 (2016) 62–89.
[18] E. Arcaute, S. Vassilvitskii, Social networks and stable matchings in the job market, in: Proceedings of WINE ’09: The
5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 5929,
Springer, 2009, pp. 220–231.
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